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ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT-OCTOBER 1974 TERM
by
Harry M. Reasoner* and John L. Carter**
T HE Fifth Circuit's October 1974 Term reflects again the major role it has
come to play in antitrust jurisprudence." Both in volume of cases and in the
importance and influence of its decisions, the Fifth Circuit has consistently
been one of the leading circuits in the country in recent years.2  During the
October 1974 Term the court handed down important decisions across the
antitrust spectrum.8
* B.A., Rice University; J.D., University of Texas; University of London. Attor-
ney at Law, Houston, Texas.
** B.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas.
1. The circuit's term runs from October 1 to September 30. Antitrust cases
decided during the October 1974 Term are reported in volumes 503 through 518 of the
Federal Reporter, Second Series.
2. For a general survey of antitrust cases in the Fifth Circuit see Comment, A
Survey of Antitrust Law in the Fifth Circuit, 11 Hous. L. REv. 640 (1974). For a
discussion of cases during the court's 1974 fiscal year see Fifth Circuit Survey, Antitrust,
6 TEXAS TECH. L. REv. 427 (1975).
3. Under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), the long struggle of
Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 509 F.2d 784 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3183 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975), finally came to an end.
Woods' holding that a single oil and gas field can constitute a relevant market for
purposes of a monopolization claim could have dramatic and far-reaching consequences
for the oil and gas industry. See Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly
Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REv. 373,
409 & n.123 (1974). The Woods litigation is extremely difficult to evaluate as
precedent, however, because its procedural history both in the state and federal courts is
convoluted and peculiar. See Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1293-96 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972),
and the opinions of the district court, 284 F. Supp. 582 (S.D. Tex. 1968), and 304 F.
Supp. 845 (S.D. Tex. 1969), and the opinion of a Texas appellate court, 382 S.W.2d 343
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1964, writ ref. n.r.e.). Also of potentially great sig-
nificance in antitrust litigation in the oil and gas industry is the court's questioning of
reliance on orders by the Railroad Commission of the State of Texas as a basis for a
state action defense. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Gas Light Co. v.
Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971).
In another Fifth Circuit case a classic § 2 claim was raised as a defense in a suit to
enforce a patent. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Sherwood Medical Indus., Inc., 516 F.2d
514 (5th Cir. 1975). The court reiterated the Fifth Circuit rule that intentional fraud
must be shown. Id. at 521; Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1975),
also contained a claim of monopolization in violation of § 2. See notes 82-85 infra and
accompanying text.
In the Robinson-Patman Act area, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), Judge Morgan's discussion
in International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 717-29 (5th
Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Jan. 5, 1976) (No. 75-943),
of what is needed beyond a mere price difference to establish sufficient primary line
competitive impact to make the price difference illegal price discrimination, is an
impressively thoughtful and significant one. The court adopts much of the analysis of
Professors Areeda and Turner in their seminal article on predatory pricing. Areeda &
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88
HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). The article promises to bring light to an area that has been
one of the murkiest in antitrust law. See ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 116
(1975). For other cases dealing with the Robinson-Patman Act see M.C. Mfg. Co. v.
Texas Foundries, Inc., 517 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1975) (no evidence of injury to competi-
tion); Hampton v. Graff Vending Co., 516 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1975) (remand for de-
termination whether gum sales are "in commerce" within the meaning of the Robinson-
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The most important developments of the term were contained in the
circuit's decisions dealing with the classic elements of a private treble
damage action claiming restraint of trade. The discussion is organized to fit
the basic elements involved in any such case: (1) jurisdiction and exemp-
tions raised as affirmative defenses to assertions of jurisdiction, (2) the
conduct alleged to constitute a restraint of trade, (3) the fact of damage or,
stated another way, the causation of damage by the proven restraint, and
(4) the amount of damage. 4
I. JUIUSDICTION
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have greatly
clarified the meaning of the "in commerce" standard of jurisdiction under the
Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts. 5 The Supreme Court has not, how-
ever, settled the meaning of the broader "affecting commerce" standard of
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. The rule, as generally stated in the
Fifth and other circuits, is that an activity is subject to regulation under the
Sherman Act if it is in interstate commerce or has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. 6 The latter formulation is the one which invokes
controversy. The Ninth Circuit in Page v. Work7 held that "the test ofjurisdiction is not that the acts complained of affect a business engaged in
interstate commerce, but that the conduct complained of affects the interstate
commerce of such business."' 8  The Fifth Circuit appeared to adopt this
test,9 but subsequently rejected it during its October 1972 Term.10
Patman Act); Bacon v. Texaco, Inc., 503 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1974) (summary judgment
that no violation of the Robinson-Patman Act occurred because gasoline sales were not
"in commerce"); and Umphres v. Shell Oil Co., 512 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff
failed to offer substantial evidence to support the elements of a price discrimination
claim).
On the procedural front, the National Screen Services Corp. trilogy contains a
thorough discussion of collateral estoppel and the applicability of the statute of limita-
tions. Exhibitors Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d 110 (5th
Cir. 1975); Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.
1975); Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1975).And, in Lee v. Venice Work Vessels, 512 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3391 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1976), the court held that a plaintiff could not maintain
a cause of action under the Sherman Act against the heirs of a party alleged to have
committed a violation, at least in an instance in which the estate of the deceased party
had been fully administered and closed prior to the time that the heirs were first served
with process.
4. See generally E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS(1965); Note, Standing To Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act,64 COLUM. L. REv. 570 (1964).
5. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 43 U.S.L.W. 4838 (U.S.
June 24, 1975) [§ 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)]; Gulf Oil Corp. v.Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974) (Robinson-Patman Act). See also Hampton v.
Graff Vending Co., 516 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1975).
6. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 43 U.S.L.W. 4723, 4726-27 (U.S. June 16,
1975).
7. 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1961).
8. Id. at 330. But see Ford Wholesale Co. v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493
F.2d 1204 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487
F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1973), both of which cite Page with approval, but do not appear
to follow its formulation.
9. See Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416
(5th Cir. 1972).
10. See Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
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In St. Bernard General Hospital, Inc. v. Hospital Service Association,1 '
decided during the October 1974 Term, the court again emphatically
rejected the test of Page v. Work. The defendant, Hospital Service Associa-
tion, was a nonprofit mutual insurance association of hospitals established to
administer a health insurance plan to subscribers, which was sold under the
trade name "Blue Cross." The plaintiff, General Hospital, limited to
nonvoting membership in the defendant association because it was a hospital
operated for profit, filed a class action suit on behalf of all member hospitals
operated for profit. Under a contract between General Hospital and the
defendant association plaintiff was paid by the association for the hospital
charges incurred by Blue Cross subscribers. General Hospital was required
to rebate to the defendant association all amounts paid to it by the as-
sociation that were in excess of the average per case payment made to the
nonprofit member hospitals. General 'Hospital alleged that the rebates that
it was required to make were fixed arbitrarily by the defendant association
and its nonprofit hospital members. It further alleged that the effect of the
rebate system was to force it to forego all profit on the business of Blue Cross
insureds or to pass the extra cost on to the insureds, thus encouraging them
to use the nonprofit member hospitals.
General Hospital characterized this conduct as a group boycott in per se
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 1 2 'Based on affidavits and
depositions, and relying on Page v. Work, the district court dismissed
General Hospital's claims for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it was limited
to assessing the impact of the alleged restraint upon "the rendition of hospital
services, . . . a purely local activity" which had no substantial effect on
interstate commerce.' 3
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court's inquiry into the
question of jurisdiction was insufficient, and remanded for determination of
the issue. While not deciding the issue of jurisdiction, the court clearly
indicated that any collateral effect on the treatment of out-of-state patients
or the purchase of supplies from out-of-state sources that the alleged restraint
might have could constitute a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to give
jurisdiction under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 1 4
The appellate court's view of jurisdiction is expansive. The central im-
pact of the alleged restraint would clearly be on an intrastate activity.1 5
denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972). The view that now apparently prevails in the Fifth
Circuit was recently adopted in the Seventh Circuit. United States v. Finis P. Ernest,
Inc., 509 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3223 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1975).
That court stated the issue as: "Our problem of interpretation is whether the elements of
restraint and interstate commerce may be satisfied separately or whether jurisdiction
requires that the restraint be upon the interstate commerce." Id. at 1258. The court
concluded that the elements could be satisfied separately.
11. 510 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1975).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); see, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207 (1959).
13. 510 F.2d at 1123-24.
14. Id. at 1124.
15. Cf. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 43 U.S.L.W. 4723 (U.S. June 16, 1975).
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Nevertheless, the court found strong support in the opinion of the Third
Circuit in the cognate case of Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross.'
The court distinguished its holding from the recent decision of Hospital
Building Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hospital,17 in which the Fourth Circuit
in an en banc opinion affirmed the dismissal of a hospital's similar Sherman
Act complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit had distinguished
complaints alleging restraints which affect many hospitals, such as that in
Doctor's Inc., from that in Hospital Building Co., which involved an alleged
restraint on one plaintiff hospital's plans for expansion. The Fifth Circuit
found this distinction persuasive, but recognized that the logic of the Hospital
Building Co. decision might support the result reached by the district court.'8
The court found comfort in the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that "each case
must turn on its own facts" with regard to questions of the sufficiency of the
effect on interstate commerce to sustain jurisdiction.
The state of the law in this area is troublesome. It is an invitation to
prolonged dilatory struggles over jurisdiction, multiple appeals, and the waste
of effort in a forum without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in Hospital Building Co.,19 and it is to be hoped that clarifying
guidelines will be given.
H. STANDING
Although the language of section 4 of the Clayton Act is broad in its
literal sweep,20 the courts have held that the class of persons with standing
to sue is more limited. The Fifth Circuit has held that only those who are
within the "target area" of the antitrust violation have standing to seek treble
damages for a Sherman Act violation. 21  In Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell 22
the plaintiff class consisted of telephone users. The complaint alleged that
the defendant telephone company, its parent company, and the parent
company's equipment manufacturing subsidiary had conspired to sell that
subsidiary's products at less than the cost of manufacturing those products.
16. 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973).
17. 511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Oct. 7,
1975).
18. 510 F.2d at 1126.
19. 44 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975).
20. "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court . . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
21. See ABA, AN'musTr LAw DEVELOPMENTS 257-70 (1975). The Fifth Circuit
has recently restated its recognition of these limitations:[P]laintiffs must show that their injuries were incurred 'by reason of' the
defendants' illegal activities. As recently noted by the Supreme Court,
the courts of appeal have imposed limitations on this aspect of the stand-
ing test, 'concluding that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to pro-
vide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced
to an antitrust violation.' Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. [405 U.S. 251] at
263, n. 14.
Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39, 48-49 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1110 (1975).
Other courts have used a standing test based on the "directness" of the alleged injury
from the alleged antitrust violation. See generally P. AREEDA, ANaRSr ANALYSIS 74-
.76 (2d ed. 1974).
22. 518 F.2d 1129 (Sth Cir. 1975).
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The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant's motive was to allow the subsidi-
ary to sell its equipment at prices lower than those of the equipment
manufacturer's competitors. The plaintiffs claimed injury in that the de-
fendant telephone company charged higher rates to telephone service sub-
scribers in order to compensate the enterprise for the loss resulting from the
below-cost sales. The telephone company allegedly was able to charge the
higher rates to its customers because, unlike the equipment manufacturing
subsidiary, it enjoyed a monopoly position. The Fifth Circuit concluded that
the plaintiff class of residential subscribers was not in the target area and did
not have standing to sue because the alleged conspiracy "was aimed at
manufacturers, sellers, and lessors of telephone equipment. '23
The court further held that the plaintiffs also lacked standing to assert
claims for injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act, 24 because
they could not show they were threatened with loss or injury proximately
resulting from the alleged violation. 25
III. EXEMPTIONS
In Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell 26 the court ruled that even if the plaintiffs
had standing, the action of the Dallas City Council in approving the phone
company's rates immunized it from attack under the state action exemp-
tion.27  The Fifth Circuit also twice dealt with the exemption from the effect
of the antitrust laws given by the McCarran-Ferguson Act 28 to the activities
of insurance companies that are regulated by state law and had one occasion
to analyze the exemption given to labor union activity. 29
23. Id. at 1131.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
25. 518 F.2d at 1132. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 257 (1975). The
court also noted that, because telephone rates are subject to control by local governmen-
tal units within the State of Texas, which control had in fact been exercised by the city
of Dallas, the plaintiff's antitrust attack would fail on its merits under the state action
exemption doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
26. 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975).
27. Id. at 1132-34; see note 25 supra.
28. Section 1012(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970),
provides:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the busi-
ness of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That
after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the
Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as
the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the busi-
ness of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
law.
There are variant spellings of "McCarran" in the Fifth Circuit. The court in Meicler v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975), spelled the name "McCarran."
The later decision in Crawford v. American Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.
1975), spelled the name "McCarron." The former is the correct spelling of the senator's
name according to the Congressional Record. 91 CONG. REc. 1442 (1945).
29. The labor activities exemption grows out of §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 17 (1970), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), and certain provisions of the Norris-La
Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1970). See ABA, ANTrrRUST LAW




In the first of the cases dealing with the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Meicler
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,80 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district
court's dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted ." The gist of the plaintiffs' complaint was that they had
been reclassified into a higher rate category by one of the defendants. The
remaining defendants, all of the automobile casualty insurance companies
licensed to do business in Texas, had allegedly acquiesced in this reclassifica-
tion and refused to sell insurance to the plaintiffs except at a rate higher than
the rate that the plaintiffs had previously paid. The defendant insurance
companies moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the activities of
which the plaintiffs complained were subject to regulation by the State of
Texas and, thus, were exempt from the federal antitrust laws. Since it was
uncontroverted that the rates at which insurance was sold to each particular
classification of insured within the state were established by the state in-
surance commission, the issue was whether such regulation reached the con-
duct of which the plaintiffs complained, i.e., the reclassification. The court
read the plaintiffs' ambiguous complaint as broadly as possible, treating the
plaintiffs as either asserting (1) that the defendants had complied with the
Texas 'Driving Insurance Plan (the classification regulations) or (2) that the
defendants had conspired to avoid the Plan's provisions.8 2 The court held,
however, that the same result would be reached in either instance. If the
parties had complied with the plan, the concerted activity clearly fell within
the McCarran-Ferguson Act antitrust exemption. If the defendants were
alleged to have conspired to avoid the plan, they would have engaged in
concerted action to "fix, maintain, increase or reduce . . . the cost of in-
surance," an activity prohibited by the Texas antitrust laws and, there-
fore, also regulated by the state. 33 As a result, the court held the McCarran-
Ferguson Act antitrust exemption would apply in either instance.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit addressed the plaintiffs' contention that their
complaint fell within the McCarran-Ferguson Act boycott exception to the
antitrust exemption.14 The court concluded that "the boycott exception was
designed to reach insurance company 'blacklists' [directed at insurance
agents or other insurance companies] rather than a refusal to sell to a
particular segment of the public at other than a specified price.'3 5  Thus,
the court of appeals held the boycott exception was inapplicable in this
instance.
30. 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975).
31. 372 F. Supp. 509 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
32. In their brief appellants specifically charged that each appellee was not making a
separate determination of fault before assessing a penalty point when an insured is
involved in an accident, as the Plan requires. Texas Driving Insurance Plan §
C(l)(b)(1). 506F.2dat734.
33. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(b)(2) (1968).
34. "Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplica-
ble to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or
intimidation." 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1970).
35. 506 F.2d at 734. See also Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261 F. Supp. 12,
26-27 (D. Ore. 1966).
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The Fifth Circuit again considered the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption
in Crawford v. American Title Insurance Co.86 The plaintiffs there com-
plained that the defendant title insurance companies and their agents had
engaged in a combination and conspiracy to fix the price of title insurance in
the greater Birmingham area. The Fifth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion,
adopted the decision of the district court dismissing the plaintiffs' claim on
the ground that the Alabama Insurance Trade Practices Law8 7 prohibited all
unfair methods of competition. Although the opinion makes it clear that,
under Alabama law, the rates for title insurance are not regulated by the
state, the district court held that if prices were fixed by the title insurance
companies, the insurance companies would have violated the prohibition of
unfair methods of competition. Accordingly, the district court held that the
defendants were protected from suit under the Sherman Act by the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act.
Judge Godbold, in a powerful dissent,88 stated his view that before
allowing a defendant to prevail on a McCarran-Ferguson Act defense, it is
necessary that the defendant establish not only that the activity is subject to
regulation by the state, but also that the activity in question has been
effectively regulated.89  As Judge Godbold recognized, there is much au-
thority to the contrary. Further, injecting the federal courts into a review of
the adequacy of state regulation would add another troublesome area of
friction in federal-state relationships.
B. Labor Union Exemption
In Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University v. Ross Aviation, Inc.40 the
jury in the district court had found that the defendants, Ross Aviation, Inc.,
its principal officer, and Local 2003 of the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers had entered a combination or conspiracy
in restraint of trade that injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff, Embry-Riddle,
and Ross had been bidders for a contract with the United States Army to
train Army personnel by using members of the defendant union, Local 2003.
Embry-Riddle claimed that after it had been awarded the contract, the union
and Ross entered a contract for the payment of wages, to which Embry-
Riddle was bound as a successor employer. Ross and Local 2003 were
36. 518 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1975).
37. ALA. CODE tit. 28A, § 227 (1973).
38. 518 F.2d at 220.
39. Judge Godbold stated:
In my view, a court faced with the issue of whether a claim of a § 2(b)
exemption is well founded must consider not merely whether the state is
regulating insurance but whether it is doing so adequately. [15 U.S.C. §
1012(b) (1970)] The language of the proviso, as illuminated by the leg-
islative history, requires such an inquiry. The proviso embodies the com-
promise which the Senate accepted after rejecting this section without the
proviso. The Senate accepted the proviso only after being told that it car-
ried into the Act a requirement that state legislation be adequate. This
concept of adequacy is contained in the 'to the extent' language in the
closing phrase of the proviso. The required inquiry simply has not been
made in this case.
Id. at 221.
40. 504 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974).
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found to have had the specific intent of causing Embry-Riddle to default on
its contract so that Ross could then obtain the training contract for itself.
The apparent motive for the union's participation in the alleged agreement
was the higher salaries that resulted for its members. On the basis of the jury
findings, the district court entered judgment against the union. The union
appealed and as one of its three grounds for reversal claimed that the alleged
activity was exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws. While recogniz-
ing that a union can properly engage in activities designed to injure or
eliminate an employer, the court of appeals held that the union had gone too
far in this instance because of its "concerted purpose [with] . ..a favored
employer."' 41 This result seems reasonable on the recited facts, but the
difficulty in the application of the labor union activities exemption is
apparent: How would the union properly have taken advantage of the
leverage given it by the fact that Ross and Embry-,Riddle were bidding
against each other and both needed its services? 42
IV. RESTRAINT OF TRADE
Of over a dozen opinions handed down by the Fifth Circuit during its
October 1974 Term that involved an alleged restraint of trade in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act, 43 only one affirmed a district court judgment
awarding damages.44  Of the other decisions, some involved instances in
which damages or causation had been insufficiently proven, but a surprising
number involved instances in which it was held that the plaintiff simply had
not proven a restraint of trade. Indeed, all of the decisions in which a
restraint of trade was found in the trial court and upheld on appeal involved
price fixing, an offense that the courts have classified as a per se violation of
the Sherman Act.
A. Vertically Imposed Price and Customer Restrictions
Despite the continuing debate among commentators concerning the wis-
dom of applying per se analysis to vertical price and territorial restriction
agreements, 45 the Fifth Circuit gave little comfort to the advocates of
applying rule-of-reason analysis to such vertical agreements. 46
41. Id. at 903-04 (emphasis by the court).
42. See Keeffe, Inconsistency is the Hobgoblin of Labor and Antitrust Law, 61
A.B.A.J. 1276 (1975).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
44. That decision, Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975),
affirmed a judgment in which the plaintiff was awarded $295,000. See notes 47-53 infra
and accompanying text. Other decisions affirmed district court findings of a violation,
but reversed or remanded the judgment for the plaintiff because of erroneous findings of
causation or amount of damage. E.g., Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506
F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975). See notes 55-58, 97-100, 116-18 infra and accompanying
text.
A judgment awarding plaintiffs over $1,000,000 based on a finding of a violation of
the Sherman Act § 2 prohibition of monopolization was also affirmed in Woods
Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 509 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3183 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975).
45. See, e.g., Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975).
46. The basic argument of those who support the application of rule of reason
[Vol. 29
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In Greene v. General Foods Corp.47 the plaintiff, Greene, a former
distributor of the defendant General Foods' products, alleged that he had
been required to sell certain products purchased from General Foods to
particular customers at prices established by General Foods ("the MFSA
price") . General Foods conceded that it had reached an agreement with
certain retail customers that its products would be delivered to those
customers at MFSA prices, but maintained that since the agreement was
between General Foods and the customer there was no violation of the
Sherman Act. In support of its position, General Foods pointed to the fact
that, with respect to sales at MFSA prices, Greene was paid a "distribution
fee." General Foods also relied on the fact that it assumed the risk of
default on credit sales to MFSA price customers since it was responsible for
collection of accounts receivable generated by such sales. Greene pointed to
the fact that goods delivered to MFSA customers were goods from his
inventory and that some of his customers had been reclassified MFSA
customers. Greene argued that his distributorship had been terminated by
defendant because of his refusal to adhere to an illegal price fixing agree-
ment with respect to the MFSA accounts.
The jury concluded that Greene's distributorship had been terminated by
the defendant because of Greene's refusal to adhere to the MFSA prices in
dealings with certain customers. The district court entered judgment for
Greene. The Fifth Circuit, after observing that the products conveyed to the
customers were owned outright by Greene and had not merely been con-
signed by General Foods, concluded that the jury's finding that an illegal
resale price maintenance agreement existed between Greene and General
Foods should not be disturbed.
At the outset, General 'Foods attempted to claim that the fact that Greene
had originally participated in this scheme himself affected his standing to file
a lawsuit concerning it. Relying upon Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Parts Corp.48 and Simpson v. Union Oil Corp.,49 the Fifth Circuit had
analysis to resale price maintenance agreements and other vertically imposed agreements
in restraint of trade is that such agreements may promote better servicing, distribution,
and marketing of the manufacturer's product-in other words, retailers will compete with
each other by providing additional services in connection with the sale of the manufac-
turer's products upon which the price is fixed. See Posner, note 45 supra. At least
some members of the Fifth Circuit appear to have adopted Professor Comanor's re-
sponse to that argument:
What is important is not whether these restrictions enhance market
coverage or customer contact, for this they may well do, but rather
whether restrictions of this character are likely to improve the competi-
tive processes through which resources are allocated to these activities.
While society generally approves of improved market coverage, it also
generally deplores higher dealer markups and higher costs of distribution.
Whether the additional gains are worth the additional costs is, of course,
the essence of the problem of resource allocation-a problem whose solu-
tion we normally leave to the market place.
Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its After-
math, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1431 (1968), cited in Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph
Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 942, n.5 (5th Cir. 1975).
47. 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S.
Nov. 10, 1975) (No. 75-693); see notes 122-25 infra and accompanying text.
48. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
49. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
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no trouble in disposing of this argument. While not speaking to the situation
where a plaintiff "is equally responsible as a co-adventurer," 50 the court
rejected the application of the in pari delicto defense in circumstances where
great disparities in size and circumstance would give a coercively dispropor-
tionate bargaining power.
After a scholarly discussion of the history of the legality of vertically
imposed price, customer, and market restrictions, the court flatly held that
General Foods' sophisticated marketing scheme was a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. 5 ' While General Foods attempted to argue that the "key
question in this case is who are the parties to the contract of sale in the
[particular] transactions, ' 52 Judge Wisdom, relying heavily on Simpson,
concluded that "courts in enforcing the antitrust laws must look to the effect
a particular business practice has upon competition and not the legal form in
which it is cast, in assessing its validity. '53
Although United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 54 suggests that with
certain limitations a manufacturer can impose territorial and price restric-
tions if the manufactured goods are not sold to a distributor but are delivered
on consignment, the opinion in Greene raises a serious question as to
whether any very large major manufacturer can properly create a distribu-
tion system utilizing independent distributors and yet retain pricing control
over its products.
While Greene is no doubt the strongest statement from the Fifth Circuit
during its October 1974 Term of its position on vertical price and market
restrictions, Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co.,55 a decision signifi-
cant in many other respects, also dealt with the issue of vertical territorial
restraints. The jury had found in that case that Coors, the defendant,
imposed both territorial and price restrictions on its distributors, one of whom
was alleged to have terminated the plaintiff as a customer because of his
failure to adhere to Coors' "pricing policy." Thus, the court was not
presented with the situation in which only vertical territorial restrictions were
imposed, as in Schwinn.56 Nevertheless, Coors argued that its territorial
restrictions were necessary in order to attract distributors and to maintain its
market penetration and the quality of its product, which was subject to
serious deterioration if improperly handled. While recognizing that other
circuits have recognized limited exceptions to the apparent per se prohibition
of territorial restrictions established by the Supreme Court in Schwinn,57 the
50. 517 F.2d at 646; see notes 127-28 infra and accompanying text.
51. 517 F.2d at 646-47.
52. Id. at 647-48.
53. Id. at 656.
54. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
55. 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en
banc denied, 509 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1975); see notes 97-100, 116-18 infra and
accompanying text.
56. Judge Gee, concurring in the result, argued that since price fixing was involved it
was unnecessary for the court to consider the question whether vertically imposed
territorial restrictions alone were a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 955.
57. The Fifth Circuit cited Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.) cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970), and United States v. Safety First Prods. Corp., 1972 Trade
Cas. 74,223 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), for the proposition that a manufacturer may restrict the
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court refused to recognize a "quality control" exception in this case.58
B. Combination, Conspiracy, or Agreement
Two cases decided by the Fifth Circuit during its October 1974 Term
demonstrate that proof of an agreement, combination, or conspiracy must be
based on evidence other than a plaintiff's circumstantial speculation. In
Shumate & Co. v. National Association of Security Dealers, Inc.,59 the Fifth
Circuit upheld a directed verdict for defendants given at the close of the
plaintiff's evidence. The plaintiff, a securities broker-dealer who was a
member of the NASD but not of any major stock exchange, alleged injury to
himself as a result of two conspiracies in restraint of trade among certain of
the defendants. The first conspiracy among the defendants allegedly was to
exclude securities listed on major stock exchanges from the NASD Automat-
ed Quotation System for a period of eight weeks. The second conspiracy
allegedly was to ignore quotations for securities listed on major stock
exchanges that were also given on the Automated Quotation System after
the six-week period. With respect to the first conspiracy, the district court
found that correspondence between the defendants that discussed the exclu-
sion was enough evidence of conspiracy to raise a fact issue for the jury, but
that the plaintiff had presented no evidence to show that it had been injured
by that alleged conspiracy. With respect to the second conspiracy, however,
the district court held that the plaintiff had not established a sufficient link
between the defendants to raise an issue of conspiracy for submission to the
jury. The plaintiff's only evidence of conspiracy was the similar conduct of
several of the defendants.
The court of appeals did not decide whether the evidence of existence of
the second conspiracy was sufficient, but affirmed the decision of the district
court because of the plaintiff's failure to present any evidence that it had
suffered any injury from either alleged conspiracy. 60
In Umphres v. Shell Oil Co.6' the plaintiff, Umphres, alleged that the
defendant, Shell, had engaged in horizontal and vertical price fixing, price
discrimination, and illegal tying arrangements. The district court found that
the plaintiff's evidence with respect to all of his allegations was insufficient to
raise an issue of fact and granted the defendant's motion for judgment. On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed per curiam. Most significant is the court's
determination that Umphres' claim of horizontal price fixing based on
"testimony that retail gasoline prices of certain name-brand service stations
customers to whom dangerous products are resold without committing a per se violation
of the Sherman Act. The court refused, however, to extend this exception to include the
case before the court, since in this case the territorial restriction not only aided Coors in
retaining control over the quality of its product, but also over wholesale and retail prices.
506 F.2d at 944. For a general discussion of these exceptions see Robinson, Recent
Antitrust Developments 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 243, 270-81 (1975).
58. See Note, Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co.: Should We Return to a
Rule of Reason, 29 Sw. L.J. 629 (1975).
59. 509 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975);
see notes 101-03 infra and accompanying text.
60. 509 F.2d at 149.
61. 512 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1975).
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in Houston tended to fluctuate in concert,"' 2 was insufficiently supported by
evidence. The court found persuasive the fact that the witness had
personal knowledge with respect to price changes at only five of approxi-
mately twenty-eight hundred service stations in the Houston metropolitan
area. Umphres is, however, a reiteration of the principle that mere parallel
conduct, without more, is insufficient to raise an issue of combination,
conspiracy, or agreement.63
C. Dealer Termination
The success of many terminated distributors, such as Greene,64 in pressing
antitrust claims against their former suppliers has led to a rash of litigation in
which the terminated distributor can point to nothing but the fact of
termination and replacement. In Burdett Sound, Inc. v. Altec Corp.65
Judge Morgan, in affirming a decision to grant the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, cautioned strongly against such claims:
Lest any other former distributor succumb to the temptation of treble
damages, we reiterate that it is simply not an antitrust violation for a
manufacturer to contract with a new distributor, and as a consequence,
to terminate his relationship with a former distributor, even if the effect
of the new contract is to seriously damage the former distributor's busi-
ness. 66
Burdett presents clearly a case of termination without allegations of price-
fixing, boycotts, or attempts to drive another competitor out of business. The
plaintiff alleged various unfair acts, but these were insufficient as a matter of
law to transform his grievance into an antitrust claim.67
Wilson v. I.B.E. Industries, Inc.6s involves a considerably more complex
terminated-dealer situation in which the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
had sought to force them to stop dealing with a certain class of customers.
62. Id. at 422.
63. For a summary discussion of the authorities dealing with the evidentiary
significance of parallel conduct see ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 34-37(1965). Professor Turner's brilliant article, The Definition of Agreement Under the
Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655(1962), remains unsurpassed as a theoretical treatment of the area.
64. See text accompanying notes 47-54 supra.
65. 515 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1975).
66. Id. at 1249. See generally Bohling, Franchise Terminations Under the Sherman
Act: Populism and Relational Power, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 1180 (1975). See also Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
67. 515 F.2d at 1248; cf. Tower Tire & Auto Center, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
392 F. Supp. 1098 (S.D. Tex. 1975), in which the court, in reliance on Albert Pick-Barth
Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp., 57 F.2d 96 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 552(1932), held that a plaintiff had stated a cause of action under the Sherman Act when he
alleged that the defendants had conspired and acted to use unfair trade practices with the
intent to injure the plaintiff as a competitor. This district court is not alone in
recognizing the validity of the Pick-Barth doctrine; see Van Dyke Ford, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,560 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Mr. Hanger, Inc. v. Rizzuto,
1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,540 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The First Circuit, its originator, however,
appears to have had some second thoughts about the validity of the doctrine. George
R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 560-62 (Ast Cir.
1974).
68. 510 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Plaintiffs contended that they were terminated because of their refusal to
stop dealing with such customers. 69 Defendants contended that the plain-
tiffs' supplies of gasoline and service station lease had been terminated
because they had paid the defendants with bad checks. The trial resulted in
a hung jury. The district court granted judgment for the defendants on the
ground that there was no evidence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy
in restraint of trade. On appeal the plaintiffs contended that the case was
controlled by United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,70 which they asserted
held that a distributor's attempt to impose any restriction on a dealer's resale
of the distributed products was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. The
Fifth Circuit concluded that the distributor-lessors had legitimate interests
that they were entitled to protect in dealing with the plaintiffs and distin-
guished Schwinn:
We therefore believe that Schwinn requires proof of something more
than an agreement to cut off one or two customers for reasons ,that have
nothing to do with the supplier's pattern of distribution or the demands
of competition. Since the record reveals, at best, only a one-time de-
mand that the appellants stop dealing with two of its customers, we hold
the per se rule of Schwinn inapplicable. Accordingly, the situation be-
fore us is simply a distributor's refusal to deal with a retailer, and it
therefore lacks any anti-trust overtones. 71
While the Fifth Circuit has not formally adopted the requirement of showing
"firm and resolute enforcement" of vertical restrictions in order to make out
a violation on a Schwinn theory, the Wilson case can be read as philosophi-
cally in line with the "firm and resolute enforcement" rationale.72
In Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.73 the court again recognized
that a supplier has a legitimate interest in a dealer or franchisee that will
support some reasonable efforts to exert influence over the business activities
of the dealer or franchisee. After holding that a franchisor can restrict the
class of persons to whom his franchisee may sell his franchise, the court also
held that the franchisor may also restrict the sales price of one of its
distributorships "in order to insure that the purchaser will have a chance to
realize a reasonable return on his investment. ' 74 This result means that
while the franchisor cannot dictate the resale price of the products he sells to
the franchisee, 75 he can within reasonable limits dictate the resale price of
69. Id. at 987.
70. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
71. 510 F.2d at 988.
72. Several courts have held that a distributor's territorial restriction on resale of
products by the distributor's customer is not a per se violation of the Sherman Act unless
the restriction is enforced on a firm and resolute basis. See, e.g., Colorado Pump &
Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973);
Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
938 (1968). The "firm and resolute" gloss on Schwinn, while subject to logical
criticism, is understandable as an attempt to mitigate the extreme effects of a literal
application of the Schwinn per se rule. See Robinson, supra note 57, at 273. See also
Copper Liquor v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 943-44 (5th Cir. 1975).
73. 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S.
Jan. 12, 1976) (No. 75-987). The decision in Kestenbaum is important in several re-
spects. See notes 90-94, 104-07, 119-21 infra and accompanying text.
74. 514 F.2d at 696.




the franchise itself, which he has also sold to the franchisee. It is significant
to note that very similar arguments (i.e., that the seller maintains an interest
in the method and manner in which his product is resold by his customer)
are advanced by those who argue that vertically imposed restraints on
distributors should not be considered per se violations of the Sherman Act.7 6
D. Tying Agreements
In addition to the allegations of tying contained in Umphres,r7 two other
cases in the Fifth Circuit in the October 1974 Term involved allegations that
defendants had engaged in illegal tying arrangements. In both cases
defendants were successful in establishing that the elements of tying had not
been proven.
In Forrest v. Capital Building & Loan Ass'n 78 two lawyers challenged the
practices of certain Baton Rouge savings and loan associations that required
lenders to pay the legal fees incurred by the association in connection with
loans made by the association. The plaintiffs complained that the arrange-
ment constituted an illegal tying arrangement, which, the plaintiffs asserted,
was a per se violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.79 The Fifth
Circuit found the arrangement to be a proper one and concluded that no
tying arrangement existed because there were not two separate products
involved (i.e., a tying product and a tied product).80 The court relied on
the fact that the rendition of the legal services was merely ancillary and
inseparable from the making of the loan itself. Further, the fact that the
association itself did not receive remuneration (at least direct remuneration)
from the sale of the lawyer's services was also deemed significant.8'
In Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co. 82 the plaintiff, the trustee in bankruptcy for
Bubble Up Corporation, argued that certain practices of the defendant Coca
Cola Company were in effect boycott and tying arrangements, per se
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Specifically, the plaintiff
complained that many of the Coca Cola franchisees had dropped the Bubble
Up product in order to distribute Coca Cola's competing soft drink, Sprite. 83
76. E.g., Posner, note 45 supra. See also note 46 supra.
77. Umphres v. Shell Oil Co., 512 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W.
3258 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1975); see text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
78. 504 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
79. See generally ABA, ANTrrRUST LAW DEvELOPMENTs 38-43 (1975); Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
80. 504 F.2d at 891; see Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594 (1953).
81. In a case involving factual allegations similar to those made in Forrest a federal
court in New Jersey held that there was an insufficient effect on interstate commerce to
establish jurisdiction under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 1975 Trade Cas. 60,570 (D.N.J. 1975); see part I supra.
82. 515 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3380 (U.S.
Dec. 23, 1975) (No. 75-893).
83. The plaintiff also argued that since Coca Cola eventually granted Sprite fran-
chises to about 85% of its franchisees, it had monopolized the relevant market, which the
plaintiff claimed consisted of bottlers franchised to distribute Coca Cola, in violation of§ 2 of the Sherman Act. Coca Cola argued that the relevant market was not so limited.
Apparently the jury agreed with Coca Cola and the court of appeals held that the jury
could properly have found the relevant market to consist of all soft drink bottlers. Id. at
848.
The court also found that the jury's rejection of the plaintiff's conspiracy to monopo-
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Coca Cola had instituted an advertising program under which the United
States was divided into 197 marketing areas. When Sprite became available
to eighty percent of the consumers in a marketing area, Coca Cola agreed to
spend twenty cents on television advertising for each gallon of Sprite syrup
purchased by the area bottlers during a three-year period. The plaintiff
claimed that this program was an illegal tying arrangement.8 4 The court of
appeals held that the arrangement did not constitute the sale of two products,
stating: "The individual bottler obviously benefited from the additional
advertising, but he did not 'purchase' it."85  The court also rejected the
claim that the program amounted to a per se illegal group boycott because
the program did not require participating bottlers to give up their Bubble Up
franchise. Since there was, accordingly, no evidence of an agreement to
boycott the plaintiff's product, the court of appeals held that the reasonable-
ness of any restraint of trade created by the implicit effect of the program
(such as the possibility that it was uneconomical for a bottler to attempt to
market two lemon-lime drinks) was properly submitted to the jury. Read as
a whole, Sulmeyer is an affirmation of the principle that casualties of
legitimate hard competition are not entitled to redress under the antitrust
laws.
E. Unreasonable Restraints
Rejecting the per se theories of the plaintiff in Sulmeyer, the jury
apparently found that the plaintiff had not established by a preponderance
of the evidence that the restraints of which it complained were unreasona-
ble. 80 While the plaintiff has the burden of showing affirmatively that
practices are unreasonable restraints of trade, Sulmeyer is illustrative of the
tactical desirability to a defendant of affirmatively presenting persuasive
business justifications, which are not anticompetitive, for practices under
attack in any antitrust suit.
lize claim was justified on the ground that the jury could have found a lack of specific
intent to gain monopoly power. The case illustrates the critical role of market definition
in any attempt to monopolize claim. Coca Cola had no intent to franchise a high
percentage of all soft drink bottlers as distributors of Sprite. Indeed, it did not even
offer Sprite franchises to independent bottlers. Id. at 851. Had the relevant market
been found to consist solely of existing Coca Cola bottlers, then the jury's finding that
Coca Cola lacked the requisite intent to monopolize would have been open to question.
The fact that Bubble Up chose to limit its efforts to obtain distribution of its product
to existing Coca Cola bottlers did not, in the view of the Fifth Circuit, limit the relevant
market to that group. Id. at 850-51. Such analysis is significant, since high market
share figures can be created for almost any product if the market for the product is de-
fined as the customers of that product's manufacturer.
For an excellent comprehensive recent discussion of attempt to monopolize theory, see
Cooper, supra note 3, passim.
84. The plaintiff apparently relied on Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972), in which it was held, inter alia, that
a franchisor's requirement that franchisees agree to purchase the franchisor's cooking
equipment and paper products in order to obtain a franchise was an illegal tying
arrangement.
85. 515 F.2d at 844. The court's conclusion that there was no sale of advertising to
the franchisees obviated the need for the court to consider the defendant's argument that
Sprite syrup and Sprite advertising are part of one product. See note 80 supra and
accompanying text.
86. 515 F.2d at 841-42.
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In Golden v. Kentile Floors, Inc.8 7 the plaintiff, as a former employee of
the defendant, had been entitled to receive benefits from the defendant's
profit-sharing plan as long as, in the judgment of a committee of three of the
defendant's present employees, the plaintiff was not engaged in competition
with the defendant. The agreement between plaintiff and defendant, which
allowed the plaintiff to participate in the plan, provided that the plaintiff had
no vested right to benefits under the plan. The committee found that the
plaintiff was competing with the defendant and, after giving notice to the
plaintiff of its intention to do so, declared that the plaintiff had no further
right to participate in the profit-sharing plan. The plaintiff attacked this
limitation on his pension rights as an unreasonable restraint of trade. The
court of appeals, relying on common law concepts of restraint of trade, held
the restraint reasonable, pointing to four factors: (1) the forfeiture provision
did not prevent the plaintiff from retaining or continuing employment with a
competitor; (2) the plan imposed no restriction on any other potential
employer; (3) the forfeiture, by the express terms of the plan, did not
operate to divest a "vested" right; and (4) the forfeiture provision, in the
context of the entire Kentile plan, was supported by reasonable business
justifications. 8 The court emphasized that the contract did not provide that
the plaintiff could not compete against the defendant, but merely provided
that he could not at the same time require the company to make payments to
him.8
9
Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.90 involved claims of price fixing,
territorial restraints, a general combination in restraint of trade, and re-
straints on the sale of a distributorship. Because of the form of the court's
charge and a lack of crucial evidence,91 the district court's judgment for the
plaintiff was reversed. The court's discussion of the necessity for proving
public injury in private treble damage actions alleging unreasonable re-
straints of trade is particularly illuminating. While recognizing that where
per se offenses are involved it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to establish an
injury to competition in order to establish a cause of action, 92 the Fifth
Circuit reaffirmed that the requirement has not been removed in a case in
which the reasonableness of a restraint is at issue. While the test remains
87. 512 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1975).
88. Id. at 845-46.
89. But see Bowen v. Wohl Shoe Co., 389 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
90. 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S.
Jan. 12, 1976) (No. 75-987); see notes 73-76 supra, notes 104-07, 119-21 infra, and ac-
companying text.
91. 514 F.2d at 693-94. A general charge on all alleged offenses was submitted to
the jury and damages were awarded. The court found a failure to prove injury from the
alleged price fixing. It was, therefore, forced to reverse and remand the entire case
because it was impossible to determine what damages the jury attributed to the alleged
price fixing. The case is an object lesson, as the court emphasized, in the desirability
in antitrust cases of adequately utilizing a special verdict, which has a liability-injury-
damage unit for each alleged violation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a); Brown, Federal
Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, 44 F.R.D. 245, 338 (1967).
92. 514 F.2d at 699; see Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). The Fifth Circuit
also affirmed this rule in Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 947
(5th Cir. 1975): "[T]he restrictions here are too intimately related with practices within
the per se proscription of Parke, Davis [resale price maintenance]. The plaintiff
therefore need not have alleged or proved a 'public injury,' as Coors contends."
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inherently ambiguous, the court did emphasize the critical point that-absent
the showing of a per se violation-more than a showing of mere individual
injury must be made. A plaintiff is not required to demonstrate specific
economic injury to competition, but is required to "show that the restraint
tends or is reasonably calculated to prejudice the public interest . . .
Thus, as a general proposition, where a restraint of trade is not a per se
violation and no injury to the public can be reasonably calculated to occur,
no recovery can be had even though a particular plaintiff might show injury
to himself because of his peculiar situation.
9 4
V. FACT OF DAMAGE
Mere proof of a violation of the antitrust laws and proof that the plaintiff
has suffered some damage is insufficient to prove a cause of action under the
Sherman Act. A plaintiff must establish a sufficiently direct causal relation
between the damages he has incurred and the antitrust violation that he has
proven. Proof of this causation or fact of damage from the violation is often
difficult and closely intertwined with the proof of the amount of his damages.
While the trier of fact in an antitrust suit is given some leeway in evaluating
the amount of damage the successful plaintiff has suffered, stricter eviden-
tiary standards have been imposed upon proof of the fact of damage. It is
in the area of fact of damage proof that the Fifth Circuit made some of the
most significant of its decisions during the October 1974 Term. Two of the
major decisions of the term discuss the causation issue at length. Several
others are predicated upon findings of insufficient evidence to support the
submission of the causation issue to the jury.
Much of the current causation discussion in the Fifth Circuit may be
traced to Terrell v. Household Goods Carriers' Bureau.95 In Terrell the
court concluded that a prior decision by the Fifth Circuit en banc had
affirmed a judgment against the defendant on the issues of both antitrust
violation and the fact of damage. Therefore, on remand the only issue
remaining to be tried was the amount of damage. On remand, however, a
second district judge had submitted to the jury interrogatories that pertained
to both causation and the amount of damage. Accordingly, on appeal from
an adverse judgment entered pursuant to a second jury verdict in favor of
the plaintiff, the defendant questioned the sufficiency of the evidence of
causation. Although apparently concerned about the prior decision on
causation, 9 6 the court held, that the issue of causation was not before it.
Cognizant of the decision in Terrell, the Fifth Circuit did not allow itself to
be drawn into the same quandary again in Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph
93. 514 F.2d at 699.
94. See Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506, 517 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972); Harrison v. Prather, 435 F.2d 1168, 1176 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971); Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Reserve Plan, Inc., 406
F.2d 1138, 1145 (8th Cir. 1969); ABA, ANTrrRusT LAw DEVELOPMENTS 265-67 (1975).
But see Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 295 F.2d 269, 276-77 (2d Cir. 1961).
95. 494 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 987 (1974).
96. Id. at22 n.11.
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Coors Co.9 7 In Coors, although affirming the trial court decision that the
defendant had committed a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings to deter-
mine "(1) whether the violation caused [the plaintiff] injury and (2) if so,
to determine damages in light of the principles stated in [its] opinion."9 8
The president of the corporate plaintiff testified that he had never sold the
defendant's product at anything other than a loss. 9  He had used the
product as a 'loss leader' and claimed that he had been terminated as a
customer because of his failure to adhere to Coors' pricing policies. The
plaintiff claimed that as a result of its termination, it had not been able to
sell as many of its other products as it otherwise would have. The amount
of these lost sales had been purportedly calculated by the plaintiff's damage
expert on the basis of a lower volume of bank deposits by the plaintiff in the
month immediately following his termination as a customer by the defend-
ant's distributor. The court rejected the obviously spurious notion of using
bank deposits for an isolated month as a measure of sales volume by
pointing to the fact that the plaintiff's average bank deposits for several
months following the plaintiff's termination showed no decline in its average
bank balance. The court emphasized the distinction between actual sales
records and bank deposits. The court's analysis of how damages might be
proved is instructive and illustrates the inevitable intertwining of fact-of-
damage and amount-of-damage issues.' 00
Shumate & Co. v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.10 1 also
discussed the quantum of proof necessary to establish the fact of damage. In
that case the district court had directed a verdict for the defendant in the
face of the plaintiff's allegations of two conspiracies. The Fifth Circuit
concluded that in both instances the plaintiff had not presented evidence of
the fact of damage from the alleged conspiracies. 10 2  The court reiterated
the critical distinction recognized in Terrell between "damages which are
definitely attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their
amount" and damages that are "uncertain" because they "are not the certain
result of the wrong.' 1° 3  A damage award is appropriate only in the first
instance.
Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.'0 4 also turned on the court's fact-
of-damage analysis. One of Kestenbaum's claims was that the defendant,
97. 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975); see notes 55-58 supra, 116-18 infra, and
accompanying text.
98. 506 F.2d at 936.
99. Below cost sales are illegal in some circumstances in Texas. TEx. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. § 15.33(b)(2)(A) (1968). There is no indication in the opinion in
Coors, however, that the possible applicability of the statute was drawn to the court's
attention.
100. 506 F.2d at 951-55.
101. 509 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3183 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975).
102. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
103. 494 F.2d at 20, citing Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931).
104. 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S.




Falstaff, and its distributors, including Kestenbaum, had entered a price
fixing agreement pursuant to which they agreed to maintain the price of
Falstaff beer so that it would be competitive with the price of brands
distributed on a regional basis. Kestenbaum admitted, however, that his
prices would have remained the same in the absence of the alleged agree-
ment.105 Further, the evidence established that other distributors whose
circumstances were similar to Kestenbaum's had raised their prices and had
suffered substantial reductions in saies. Therefore, there was no evidence of
any injury to Kestenbaum from the alleged price fixing agreement itself.
Kestenbaum argued further, however, that Falstaff's policy of increasing its
prices to him by fifty percent of the amount of any increase in price that he
might impose established injury in fact. The court responded that "while
Falstaff's increase in price to Kestenbaum may be classified as arbitrary,
such increase is not itself violative of the antitrust laws, nor does it afford a
basis for proof of injury even though it is coupled with a price ceiling
requirement which is a per se violation.' '106  Therefore, the court of appeals
concluded that the plaintiff had not offered sufficient evidence of the fact of
damage from the illegal price fixing to raise an issue for the jury. The court
also concluded that the trial court erred in submitting any issue to the jury
inquiring if the defendant was guilty of vertically imposing territorial restric-
tions upon Kestenbaum's sales because of his failure to offer any proof that
damages resulted from such a restraint. 07
In M.C. Manufacturing Co. v. Texas Foundries, Inc. 0 8 the court again
reversed a district court decision on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed
to offer sufficient evidence to raise the issue of fact of damage. One of the
plaintiffs had been the third lowest bidder on a particular government
contract. The defendants were the successful bidder and that bidder's
supplier of a particular part necessary for the manufacture of the product
upon which bids had been submitted. The plaintiffs (the unsuccessful
bidder and its parent company) claimed that the defendant bidder had been
able to make a lower bid because the defendant supplier had sold its product
to the defendant bidder at a lower price than it had offered to sell its product
to the plaintiffs. This, the plaintiffs claimed, was actionable under both the
Robinson-Patman Act' 09 and section 1 of the Sherman Act.
105. Id. at 694.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 697.
108. 517 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1975). There is an interesting development collateral
to this case. Texas Foundries, Inc., the defendant in the federal antitrust suit, filed suit
in state court to collect from the antitrust plaintiffs money due to Texas Foundries on an
open account. M.C. Manufacturing filed a "plea in bar" alleging that, pursuant to FED.
R. Cv. P. 13, the sworn account claim should have been filed as a counterclaim in the
action in the federal court. The Texas district court overruled this plea and grantedjudgment to Texas Foundries. The Texas court of civil appeals affirmed this decision,
noting that in personam judgments were sought in both the federal and state courts and
that no final judgment had been reached in the federal court at the time the state district
court reached its decision. M.C. Mfg. Co. v. Texas Foundries, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 269
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3398
(U.S. Jan. 12, 1976).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970). The Fifth Circuit also held that the plaintiffs had not
established a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act in this instance because they had not,
19751
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The plaintiffs' Sherman Act claim was predicated on their assertion that
the defendant bidder and the defendant supplier had entered a conspiracy
with the intent of driving the competitive plaintiffs out of business. Assum-
ing that the plaintiffs' theory of the case was accepted by the jury, the court
concluded that a Sherman Act violation had been established, but that the
defendants should have been granted a directed verdict because of plaintiffs'
failure to show injury from the discriminatory pricing scheme. 110 The
court's conclusion was based on the uncontroverted fact that had the
defendant bidder been unsuccessful in obtaining the government contract,
the contract would have been awarded to the second lowest bidder, a
company unconnected with either defendant. The plaintiffs attempted to
circumvent this result by arguing that had they received the same conspirato-
rial price that the defendant supplier had given to the defendant bidder, their
bid would have been lower than that of the second lowest bidder. The Fifth
Circuit rejected this contention on the ground that the purpose of the
Sherman Act is to protect fair competition, not hypothetically to broaden
conspiracies to give excluded competitors the benefit of them.
Terrell, Coors, Shumate & Co., Kestenbaum, and M.C. Manufacturing
Co. emphasize the necessity of establishing the fact of damage with compe-
tent evidence. The emphasis is a most salutary one. In view of the broader
standards often applied to the quantum of damages awarded in antitrust
cases, it is particularly important to require a reasonable degree of certainty
in determining that a plaintiff has been damaged. In the absence of proof
of causation, antitrust damages become an unwarranted burden for a
defendant and a windfall for the plaintiff that serves no statutory or social
purpose."'
VI. DAMAGES
The area of damages in private antitrust actions is one of the most
troubling in our jurisprudence. Many antitrust claims are based on theoreti-
cal potential economic consequences that may result from particular conduct.
A cause of action may be established on the basis of that conduct with no
trace of the kind of intent or negligence required in tort law. Yet that
conduct can be the basis for enormous damage claims based on theories
which are completely esoteric to laymen. 1 2 As Judge Friendly observed, in
determining damages in an antitrust action "a jury's common sense is less
available than usual to protect it."1'  Intricacies of a complicated business,
and, in the view of the court, could not establish an injury to competition. For a
discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the plaintiff's section one claims see
Areeda & Turner, supra note 3.
110. 517 F.2d at 1063-64.
111. The Fifth Circuit in Terrell emphasized that a defendant need not demonstrate
that the antitrust violation was the sole proximate cause of his injury, but cautioned that,
in a case where it was not, the jury must be instructed to allocate the damage resulting
from that violation. 494 F.2d at 20.
112. See, e.g., the damage claims of the plaintiff in Telex Corp. v. International
Business Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (D. Okla. 1973), rev'd in part and aff'd in part,
510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
113. Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 912 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962).
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of economic theory, and of cost accounting can leave a jury uncomprehend-
ing and feeling its way by a vague emotional sense of what it thinks are
appropriate moral standards. Unfortunately, suffering caused by hard
competition can easily be confused with wrongful injury. Maxwell Blecher,
one of the most effective plaintiffs' antitrust lawyers in the country, puts it
this way:
[T]he jury's decision is not reached by applying highly technical,
sophisticated, legal concepts to a relatively complex fact situation. It
is, in my judgment, made on the simple basis of morality. The plaintiff
wins because the jury, through the mysterious chemistry that operates
inside the jury room, has determined that the plaintiff has been wronged
or, in the language of the street, has been kicked around by ,the defend-
ants and is thus entitled to some recompense.' 14
Plaintiffs who have been "kicked around" with practices judged to be
harmful to our economy and, thus, prohibited by the antitrust laws should, of
course, be compensated for proven damages they have incurred. To
recompense plaintiffs who have been buffeted by the forces of competition
because of their own inadequacies, economic or technological changes, or
simply because they failed in the competitive struggle, is, however, destruc-
tive of the very values which the antitrust laws were designed to protect. The
complexity of the area demands rigorous and careful analytical application
of legal standards. Several of the Fifth Circuit's opinions in the damage
area are praiseworthy examples of the standard that is required for a socially
beneficent antitrust policy. The court, while reiterating the fact that some-
what broader standards for measuring the amount of damage are applied in
the antitrust area than are applied in many other substantive areas of the
law, exhibited a greater concern for the quality of evidence and the theo-
retical bases utilized in proving amount of damages."15
In Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 16 which turned on the
plaintiff's failure to prove the fact of damage, the court offered a powerful
critique of the evidence of damages that had been accepted by the district
114. Blecher, Trial of an Antitrust Treble Damage Suit: The Plaintiff's Viewpoint, 38
ANTITRUST L.J. 50, 52 (1968).
115. During the October 1973 Term the Fifth Circuit affirmed two major decisions in
which damages were awarded because of violations of the antitrust laws. Lehrman v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Terrell
v. Household Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S.
987 (1974). The plaintiff in Terrell had previously been unsuccessful in proving
damages. Household Goods Carriers' Bureau v. Terrell, 452 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971)(en banc). Both Lehrman and Terrell incorporated to a certain extent the "yardstick"
method of proving the amount of damage. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S.
251 (1946). The yardstick method utilizes the profitability of a similarly situated firm
that is not subject to the antitrust restraint to gauge the damage done to the firm that is
restrained. See Parker, Measuring of Damages in Federal Treble Damage Actions, 17
ANTITRUST BULL. 497 (1972); Comment, Monetary Recovery Under Federal Antitrust
Statutes, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 856 (1967). Lehrman utilized a combination of the
yardstick method and the "before-and-after" method of proving the amount of damage.
The before-and-after method of proving damages measures the damage done to the
antitrust victim by that firm's profitability prior to the time that the restraint was
imposed. Id.




court. The plaintiff in Coors had attempted to prove his damages by
showing a decline in the amount of deposits to his checking account in the
single month after defendants had refused to sell him additional Coors beer.
The plaintiff's expert then used this percentage loss together with an average
volume of sales to calculate the plaintiff's damages. As was discussed in the
preceding section, the court rejected the use of deposits for a single month
and pointed out that the plaintiff's average bank deposits on a monthly basis
had not declined after the termination. Further, the court emphasized the
need for proper foundation evidence such as sales records and cost data to
support expert testimony and the need to take into account negative factors
affecting future profits (such as the fact that Coors beer was in short
supply). The decision on rehearing in Coors makes it clear, however, that
"just and reasonable estimates based upon relevant data" are appropriate
once actual injury has been demonstrated. 117  The significance of the
decision is in the rigor of the analysis used in reviewing the relevant data
pertaining to the amount of damage and the proof of the fact of injury."18
In Kestenbaum," 9 another case that turned on the plaintiff's failure to
prove the fact of damage, the court of appeals also found a failure to prove
adequately the amount of damages, stating that "[a]n award may not be
based . . .solely on speculation or guesswork."u 20  Some of the damages
awarded to Kestenbaum by the district court were apparently based on the
plaintiff's assertion that he had lost good will as a result of the defendant
Falstaff's alleged antitrust violations. The only evidence of the amount of
this good will was the plaintiff's own testimony. While holding that an
owner was entitled, in most instances, to give an opinion as to the good will
of his business, the court cautioned that the defendant should have the right
to cross-examine the plaintiff with respect to his opinion, and further
emphasized that if the opinion were based solely on "speculative factors,"
the testimony could lack sufficient probative force to warrant submission to
the jury.' 2 '
In Greene v. General Foods Corp.'2 2 the plaintiff, Greene, asserted that
the measure of his damages was the profit that he had foregone as a result of
certain products being sold pursuant to General Foods' price fixing scheme,
rather than at the higher price he could have obained had he been free to
establish the price at which those products were to be sold. Further, Greene
had postulated damages that resulted from the partial destruction of his
business because of his termination as a distributor after he had refused to
adhere to the price fixing scheme. The opinion reflects an apparently
117. Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 509 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1975).
118. Compare Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
509 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3183 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975); see
note 3 supra.
119. Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975), petition
for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1976) (No. 75-987); see notes 73-76,
90-94, 104-07 supra and accompanying text.
120. 514 F.2d at 698.
121. Id. at 699.
122. 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S.
Nov. 10, 1975) (No. 75-693); see notes 47-54 supra and accompanying text.
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balanced and conservative appraisal by his expert of the plaintiff's dam-
age.1 23  While not free from criticism, the damage evidence submitted in
Greene has some value as a model for a plaintiff attempting to show
damages based on allegations of lost past profits and partial destruction of
his business.
Greene is also significant for the court's recognition of the basic economic
fact that a plaintiff should not be allowed to recover both lost future profits
and "going concern value" of a business destroyed by an antitrust viola-
tion.124  Since the going concern value (measured by good will) represents
only discounted future profits, it would seem obvious that courts would not
permit recovery for both. 12
5
It is also significant that the Fifth Circuit in both Greene1 2 6 and Kesten-
baum 27 noted that the plaintiff's voluntary involvement in a practice in
restraint of trade can be a factor to be accorded significant weight in
measuring the damages to be awarded. The court in the latter case stated
that "by-products of a restriction inuring to a plaintiff's benefit can be
considered in computing damages.' 1 28  Thus, if a plaintiff profits from
involvement in the scheme he alleges to be illegal, such profits should be
offset against the damages he incurs through participation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The significance of the antitrust decisions of the Fifth Circuit during its
October 1974 Term is not the enunciation by the court of dramatic changes
in substantive legal principles. Rather, the significance is found in the
court's rigorous analysis of the evidence presented to support the specific
elements of an antitrust violation,129 the court's concern for the quality of
the evidence to be considered, 130 and the court's attentiveness to realistic
economic analysis in formulating legal standards."' These developments
123. 517 F.2d at 660-66.
124. Id. at 663.
125. In Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 664 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 929 (1975), the court said, that "[i]t is clear that an award including both
[lost future profits and going concern value] is inappropriately duplicitous." The court
in Lehrman was willing to presume that the jury's verdict did not include an award of
both types of damages. Id. at 665. The decision indicates the desirability of having
the components of a damage award separately identified by a jury.
126. 517 F.2d at 646.
127. 514 F.2d at 695; see notes 73-76, 90-93, 104-07, 119-21 supra and accompanying
text. The court in Kestenbaum noted that the decision in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), did not foreclose the possibility that a
court could hold that a party who had equal responsibility for establishing a practice that
is illegal under the antitrust laws may be barred from recovering damages under the
antitrust laws by the doctrine of in pari delicto. 514 F.2d at 695 n.4. See also a similar
reference in Greene: "We have no occasion here to consider to what extent the 'in pari
delicto' doctrine will continue to function in private antitrust litigation, if indeed the
plaintiff is equally responsible, or a co-adventurer." 517 F.2d at 646; see notes 48-50
supra and accompanying text.
128. 514 F.2d at 695.
129. E.g., Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1976) (No. 75-987).
130. E.g., Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975).
131. E.g., International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714
(5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Jan. 5, 1976) (No. 75-
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seem to reflect a heightened concern for these same matters recently
demonstrated in the decisions of the Supreme Court.' 3 2 Certainly, they
reflect the sophistication of the circuit in dealing with a complex, vital, and
rapidly expanding area of civil practice. 183
943); Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert.
filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1975) (No. 75-693).
132. See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974),
discussed in Note, 53 N.C.L. REv. 535 (1975). See also Alcorn, Merger Analysis for
Banks and Others-Maine Bancorporation and Connecticut National Bank, 12 Hous. L.
REv. 539 (1975).
133. See the relevant portion of REPORT OF THE Dr -roR, AD ms TRATrv OFFICE
OF UNrrED STATES CouRTS, in CCH TRADE REG. REP. No. 199, at 7 (Oct. 20, 1975).
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